In this thesis, we address issues related to tra c analysis attacks and the corresponding countermeasures in VoIP tra c. We focus on a particular class of tra c analysis attack, timing- shows the e↵ectiveness of the proposed scheme in term of countering timing-based correlation attacks.
Our experimental result showed that our application is able to hide user's identity in VoIP communication, with a few modifications in the sending process.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Research Motivation
Voice over IP (VoIP) communications are continuing gaining popularity due to their cost savings and rich features. By using this type of technology, users are able to use the telepone calls over the Internet and do not need to pay for any extra cost except for the Internet access fees. Because of the popularity of VoIP, a increasing number of Internet hackers started to focus on attacking VoIP users. In the past, the most famous type of attack is based on packet size. In this type of attack, attackers are able to analyze packets information and grab the information they want. In order to prevent this type of attack, numerous e↵orts such as SRTP [2] and ZRTP used in Zfone [18] have been put into securing VoIP communications.
However VoIP communications are still vulnerable to tra c analysis attacks based on VoIP tra c patterns. Through the tra c analysis attacks, attackers can identify speeches [14] , identify languages used into the VoIP communications [15] , and identify speakers [16] . Thus, VoIP tra c patterns based attacks are aim to identify user's identity: their language, their topic, etc. Currently, the most common way to hide user's identity in the Internet is using anonymous communication softwares, like Tor [11] , however, these softwares still potentially su↵er from VoIP tra c patterns based attacks since it is designed for hiding tra c information rather than VoIP tra c pattern.
This project studies user identification attacks and the corresponding countermeasures in Encrypted Speech Communications" [17] , attackers are able to "detect speakers of encrypted speech communications with high accuracy based on traces of 15 minutes long on average." So it is significant for us to find a way to fix this defect before this technology can move forward.
In this thesis, we propose a pattern hiding approach to mitigate tra c analysis attacks on VoIP communications. The approach hides tra c patterns by adding dummy packets, dropping VoIP packets, and delaying VoIP packets. The approach optimizes pattern hiding in terms of dissimilarity from the original tra c pattern and the optimization is under constraints on dummy packet rate, VoIP packet drop rate, and VoIP packet delay.
We formally modeled the behavior of an adversary who launches tra c analysis attacks. In order to successfully identify the user who is sending packets through the VoIP Application, the correlation techniques must accurately measure the similarity of user's output tra c and adversary's sample tra c. Correlation method that is used in this type of attack, namely DTW based Correlation. DTW based Correlation is used to measure the similarity of two tra c with di↵erent length. Moreover, we developed a pattern hiding module and measure the e↵ectiveness in countering tra c analysis attacks.
1
Talk spurt is a continuous segment of speech between two silence intervals 2 Silence gap is the time intervals between two talk spurts
Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis organized as follow: Chapter 2 covers the literature survey on existing researches on VoIP, anonymous network and pattern hiding. Chapter 3 defines the formal problem statement. Chapter 4 introduces the design of our pattern hiding module and its detailed implementation. Chapter 5 set up a series experiment based on our pattern hiding module and analyzes the experiment result. Chapter 6 we makes conclusion based on experiment result and discuss the limitation. Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and future works. 
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Potential Attacks on VoIP
Skype, as one of the most popular VoIP service provider is able to protect users' privacy by using some unique features, such as: strong encryption, proprietary protocols, unknown codecs, dynamic path selection, and the constant packet rate. However, a number of researchers have shown that there still possible for attackers to compromise users' privacy according to a new tra c analysis attacks which is based on application-level features extracted from VoIP call traces [16] . Some recent research shows that when the audio is encoded using variable bit rate codecs, the length of encrypted VoIP packets can be used to identify the phrase spoken within a call and the language of the conversation. [14] [15]
In Zhu Ye's paper: "Tra c Analysis Attacks on Skype VoIP Calls" [16] 
Pattern Hiding Techniques
Some of the countermeasure methods have been developed for hiding network tra c. For example, NetCamo [8] is able to camouflage network tra c.par In [5] , Tor proved to be a useful for web browsing anonymous, but it is not able to e↵ectively hide voice tra c. In paper [16] [14] [15] , the length of encrypted VoIP packets are being used to identify users and languages.
NetCamo [8] provide a useful way to camouflage the tra c to avoid these identifications. In our paper, we focus pattern tra c hiding in VoIP communications without compromising the real-time requirement.
In speech communications, an analog voice signal is first converted into a voice data stream by a chosen codec. Typically in this step, compression is used to reduce the data rate. The voice data stream is then packetized in small units of typically tens of milliseconds of voice, and encapsulated in a packet stream over the Internet. A silence detector makes voice-activity decisions based on the voice frame energy, equivalent to average voice sample energy of a voice packet. If the frame energy is below a threshold, the voice detector declares silence.
Hangover techniques are used in silence detectors to avoid sudden end-clipping of speeches. From previous researches, a lot of e↵ort had been put on securing speech communication, so we assume the VoIP tra c is encrypted with one of the secure versions of the RTP protocol such as SRTP [2] or ZRTP used in Zfone [18] to protect confidentiality of speech communications.
We also assume VoIP packets are of the same size because of the following reasons:
1. Most codecs used in current speech communications are CBR codecs 1 .
2. During encryption, speech packets can be padded to a fixed length.
1
Variable bit rate (VBR) codecs are primarily used for coding audio files instead of real-time speech communications [13, 3] .
We assume attackers uses following speaker detection methods: detect speaker with a specific encrypted speech communication, such as the online course instructor, e-conference meeting speaker. In this project, we assume the interest speaker is Alice. Before apply speaker detection on Alice, attacker, we call it Eve, will first collect encrypted speech communications data send by Alice in advance so that Eve can compare the data he got with these encrypted speech communication data and see if they are match.
In order to define adversary's power, we also make following assumptions:
1. We assume an adversary is able to eavesdrop VoIP tra c to and from the computer running VoIP software.
2. Since VoIP packets are encrypted and of the same length, the adversary attempts to disclose sensitive information through timing of VoIP packets.
To sum up, In this project, we assume that the adversary uses a classical timing analysis attack, which summarized as follow:
1. The adversary observe user?s output network tra c, collects the inter-arrival times of the packet and generate user?s talk spurts and silence gap with optimal threshold.
2. To maximize adversary?s power, we assume that he can catch all the tra c from his observed user.
3. The optimization model?s techniques and strategies are known to the adversary. This is a typical assumption in the study of security systems. Above two assumptions create worst case scenario in terms of security analysis.
4. The adversary cannot correlate input talk spurts and silence gaps to output talk spurts and silence gaps. Content and packet size correlation is prevented by encryption and packet timing based correlation is prevented by batching.
5. Finally we assume that the specific objective of the adversary is to identify the user of output tra c.
CHAPTER 4. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Overview
The pattern hiding module is designed to hide the on-o↵ pattern in VoIP tra c. We quantify the hiding performance as the correlation between the on-o↵ pattern in the original tra c and the on-o↵ pattern in the perturbed tra c. We denote the length of the ith talk spurt and the ith silence gap in the original tra c as x t i and x s i respectively. Similarly the ith talk spurt and the ith silence gap in the perturbed tra c can be denoted as y t i and y s i respectively. So the on-o↵ patterns in the original tra c and the perturbed tra c can be denoted as X =
where n is the number of talk spurts and silence gaps. The correlation between the on-o↵ patterns can be written as:
The goal of the module is to minimize the correlation defined in Equation 4.1. The time perturbation to the tra c can be adding dummy packets, dropping VoIP packets, and delaying VoIP packets. Any of the timing perturbation techniques incur costs:
1. Adding dummy packets can increase bandwidth usage.
Dropping VoIP packets can degrade QoS of VoIP communications. QoS of VoIP commu-
nications is acceptable if the packet drop rate is less than 5%.
3. Delaying VoIP packets can increase the overall delay of VoIP packets and cause QoS degradation of VoIP communications.
Add Dummy Packets: When we add a packet, we will insert a dummy packet between two VoIP packets, so that these packets can either generate two silence gaps instead of one.
(Because insert a packet in talk spurt will not change the pattern, here we assume all the new packets are inserted during silence gap) or cover the silence gap. As Delay VoIP Packets:When we delay a packet, we will hold the packet for certain period of time before send it out, so that we can create a new silence gap or enlarge the original silence gap. In Figure 4 .3, it shows the original VoIP packet data: 2 packets and 1 gap. In the lower half of the figure, it shows that Packet 2 has been moved to a further location in the timeline, which enlarge the gap between Original Packet 1 and Original Packet 2. In this situation, it will either generate a new silence gap or enlarge the original silence gap. Either way, this action will change the user's talking pattern.
So the module can be essentially formulated as an optimization problem: The goal is to minimize the objective function defined in Equation 4.1. The constraints of the optimization problem are the limit on the adding rate of dummy tra c (denoted as lim add ), the limit on the dropping rate of VoIP packets (denoted as lim drop ), and the limit on the delay to VoIP packets (denoted as lim delay ). Recall that our applications objective is to minimize the correlation between input talk spurts/silence gaps and output talk spurts/silence gaps. This could be achieved by adding dummy packets into the normal tra c, dropping actual packets from the normal tra c and delay original packets in the normal tra c. Using these methods, we are able to generate a modified output inter-arrival time, which are di↵erent from input inter arrival time. To find the minimum correlation between input and output inter-arrival time, we have two options, first, we can use mathematic correlation formula to make decision on add,drop and delay packet, in our research, we used Pearson?s correlation coe cient formula. Another method is using dynamic time warping algorithm to find the optimal match between two given sequences with certain restriction. The optimization has to run as an online algorithm as the input to the optimization such as the on-o↵ pattern in the original tra c is not known in advance. The online optimization starts with replicating the first n 1 talk spurts and silence gaps from the input of the module, i.e., the original tra c, to the output of the module, i.e., the perturbed tra c. Given the first n 1 talk spurts and silence gaps in both the input and the output of the module, the optimization algorithm computes the optimal length of the nth talk spurt in the output. From then on, the optimization computes the optimal length of the next talk spurt or silence gap in the output based on the previous n 1 talk spurts and silence gaps in the input and the output of the module.
Since the optimization has to run as an online algorithm, the packet delay caused by the optimization needs to be taken into account. For example, to compute the optimal length of the ith talk spurt in the output tra c, the optimization algorithm needs to know the length of the corresponding talk spurt in the input tra c. The optimization will not know the end of the talk spurt until one packetization delay after the arrival of the last packet of the talk spurt, which is approximately 20ms or 30ms for most codecs. Since the optimization also needs computation time, the last packet of the talk spurt needs to be delayed at least for one packetization delay and the computation delay of the optimization before a decision can be made for the packet.
The excessive delay is not acceptable for VoIP communications.
To avoid the excessive delay, our optimization algorithm does not compute based on the actual length of the current talk spurt or silence gap. Instead, the algorithm computes based on the predicted length of the next talk spurt or silence gap. As shown in 4.4, the pattern hiding module has following three steps:
• The prediction step predicts the length of the next talk spurt or silence gap based on the history of the on-o↵ patterns.
• The optimization step calculates the optimal length of the next talk spurt or silence gap in the output tra c based on the predicted length of the next talk spurt or silence gap.
• The compensation step computes compensation needed to achieve the optimal pattern hiding because of prediction error. Randomization is also included in the compensation step to randomize output tra c and the randomization can make output tra c traces generated from the same input tra c di↵erent from each other.
We describe the details of each step in the rest of this section.
Prediction Step
In this paper, we use a neural network to predict the length of the next talk spurt or silence gap. Neural networks have been successfully applied to predict time series data such as stock index [12] and solar activity [6] . The neural network used in this paper is the nonlinear autoregressive network with exogenous inputs (NARX) model [9] . As shown in Figure 4 .5, the NARX model used in this paper is a two-layer feedforward network with one hidden layer and one output layer. In Figure 4 .5, the prediction is on silence gaps and the past talk spurts are used as the external input. When predicting length of talk spurts, past silence gaps are used as the external input. 
Optimization Step
Given the predicted length of the next talk spurt or silence gap in the input tra c from the previous step, the optimization step outputs the optimal length of the next talk spurt or silence gap. Without loss of generality, we assume the input and output of this step are x p,s j , the predicted length of the next silence gap in the input tra c, and y o,s j , the optimal length of the output tra c respectively. The objective function is as shown in (4.2).
In the objective function (4.2), the only variable is y o,s j . Since the optimization is online, all the lengths of the previous talk spurts and silence gaps are known.
The single-variable optimization problem can be solved with the classical approach based on the derivative test. The solution of the optimization problem can be found in Appendix .
To avoid repetition, we focus on the optimizing the length of the next silence gap only in this subsection. The length of the next talk spurt can be optimized in the same way.
Compensation Step
The compensation step is designed for two purposes:
1. The optimization step is based on the predicted length of the next talk spurt or silence gap and any prediction error can lead to performance degradation in pattern hiding.
This step is designed to compensate the degradation in hiding performance due to the prediction error.
2. This step is also designed to add randomization in pattern hiding and the randomization makes two traces of perturbed tra c corresponding to the same original tra c di↵erent.
The di↵erences can mitigate replay attacks by replaying the original tra c.
There are four cases in the compensation steps. Without loss of generality, we assume the next talk spurt or silence gap is the jth talk spurt or silence gap.
Recall that input tra c are consists of talk spurts and silence gaps, thus, optimization can be classified into two classes: talk spurt optimization and silence gap optimization. We will see that di↵erent classes should have di↵erent optimization method. For both talk spurt optimization and silence gap optimization, output value come up with two parts: (1) optimal value calculated by Pearson's Correlation Coe cient Formula, called O and (2) makeup value,called M , is generated by prediction error and random coe cient, If we define predicted value which generated by Optimization Model is P , Since both optimal value of talk spurt and silence gap could be either grater than or equal to predicted value or less than predicted value, we can divide each class into two subclasses. Based on these classes, we will discuss each in detail:
Situation1: talk spurt optimization and optimal value O is grater than or equal to predicted value P . As Figure 4 .6 shows, with O and P given, actual talk spurt could end in following three place: a1: less than both O and P ; a2: grater than P and less than O; a3: grater than both O and P . Situation2: talk spurt optimization and optimal value O is less than predicted value P . As Figure 4 .7 shows, with O and P given, actual talk spurt could end in following three place: a1:
less than both O and P ; a2: grater than O and less than P ; a3: grater than both O and P .
a1: if actual talk spurt end at a1, the optimization model will hold packets in bu↵er as long as possible and start to drop packets at a1. To minimize e↵ect of prediction error and add randomness to the optimal value, optimization model will generate makeup value M = ✓(p a1),
where ✓ is random coe cient. So final optimal value for this situation is f 1 = O ✓(p a1).
a2: if actual talk spurt end at a2, the optimization model will hold packets in bu↵er as long as possible and start to drop packets at a2. To minimize e↵ect of prediction error and add randomness to the optimal value, optimization model will generate makeup value M = ✓(p a2),
where ✓ is random coe cient. So final optimal value for this situation is f 2 = O ✓(p a2).
a3: if actual talk spurt end at a1, the optimization model will hold packets in bu↵er as long as possible and start to drop packets at a3. To minimize e↵ect of prediction error and add randomness to the optimal value, optimization model will generate makeup value M = ✓(a3 p),
where ✓ is random coe cient. So final optimal value for this situation is f 3 = O ✓(a3 p).
Situation3: silence gap optimization and optimal value O is grater than or equal to predicted value P . As Figure 4 .8 shows, with O and P given, actual silence gap could end in following three place: a1: less than both O and P ; a2: grater than P and less than O; a3: grater than both O and P .
a1:If actual silence gap end at a1, the optimization model will hold packets as long as possible and start to drop packets at a1. To minimize e↵ect of prediction error and add randomness to the optimal value, optimization model will generate makeup value M = ✓(p a1), where ✓ is random coe cient. So final optimal value for this situation is f 1 = O ✓(p a1).
a2:If actual silence gap end at a2, the optimization model will hold packets as long as possible and start to drop packets at a2. To minimize e↵ect of prediction error and add randomness to the optimal value, optimization model will generate makeup value M = ✓(p a2), where ✓ is random coe cient. So final optimal value for this situation is f 2 = O + ✓(p a2).
a3:If actual silence gap end at a3, the optimization model will hold packets as long as possible and start to drop packets at a3. To minimize e↵ect of prediction error and add randomness to the optimal value, optimization model will generate makeup value M = ✓(a3 p), where ✓ is random coe cient. So final optimal value for this situation is f 3 = O + ✓(a3 p).
Situation4: silence gap optimization and optimal value O is less than predicted value P . As Figure 4 .9 shows, with O and P given, actual silence gap could end in following three place:
a1: less than both O and P ; a2: grater than O and less than P ; a3: grater than both O and P .
a1:If actual silence gap end at a1, the optimization model adds dummy packets to
M is generated by prediction error and random coe cient, in this case, M = ✓(p a1), where ✓ is random coe cient.
a2:f actual silence gap end at a2, the optimization model adds dummy packets to f 2 = O M .
M is generated by prediction error and random coe cient, in this case, M = ✓(p a2), where ✓ is random coe cient.
a3:If actual silence gap end at a3, the optimization model adds dummy packets to
M is generated by prediction error and random coe cient, in this case, M = ✓(a3 p), where ✓ is random coe cient. Summarize above situations, we can formally define these 4 algorithms:
In this case, y o,t j , the optimal length of the talk spurt from the previous step, is greater than or equal to x p,t j , the predicted length of the talk spurt from the prediction step. The compensation will be determined as follows: The prediction error is calculated as the di↵erence between x p,t j , the predicted length of the jth talk spurt, and x t j , the actual length of the jth talk spurt. The compensation M is ✓ times the prediction error and ✓ is a random number.
The random number ✓ is added to mitigate replay attacks and a di↵erent random number will be generated for each talk spurt or silence gap. The length of the talk spurt in the output tra c is determined based on the optimal length of the talk spurt and the compensation. The pseudo-code of the compensation in this case is shown in Algorithm 1.
In this case, y o,t j , the optimal length of the talk spurt from the previous step, is less than x p,t j , the predicted length of the talk spurt from the prediction step. The compensation will be determined as follows: The prediction error is calculated as the di↵erence between x p,t j , the predicted length of the jth talk spurt, and x t j , the actual length of the jth talk spurt. The compensation M is ✓ times the prediction error and ✓ is a random number. The random number ✓ is added to mitigate replay attacks and a di↵erent random number will be generated for each talk spurt or silence gap. The length of the talk spurt in the output tra c is determined j , the optimal length of the silence gap from the previous step, is greater than or equal to x p,s j , the predicted length of the silence gap from the prediction step. The compensation will be determined as follows: The prediction error is calculated as the di↵erence between x p,s j , the predicted length of the jth silence gap, and x s j , the actual length of the jth silence gap. The compensation M is ✓ times the prediction error and ✓ is a random number. The random number ✓ is added to mitigate replay attacks and a di↵erent random number will be generated for each talk spurt or silence gap. The length of the talk spurt in the output tra c is determined based on the optimal length of the talk spurt and the compensation. The pseudo-code of the compensation in this case is shown in Algorithm 3. j , the optimal length of the silence gap from the previous step, is less than x p,s j , the predicted length of the silence gap from the prediction step. The compensation will be determined as follows: The prediction error is calculated as the di↵erence between x p,s j , the predicted length of the jth silence gap, and x s j , the actual length of the jth silence gap. The compensation M is ✓ times the prediction error and ✓ is a random number. The random number ✓ is added to mitigate replay attacks and a di↵erent random number will be generated for each talk spurt or silence gap. The length of the talk spurt in the output tra c is determined based on the optimal length of the talk spurt and the compensation. The pseudo-code of the compensation in this case is shown in Algorithm 4. 
Algorithm 4:
Compensation in Case y o,s j < x p,s j Data: x s j : the actual length of the jth silence gap y o,s j : the optimal length of the jth silence gap x p,s j : the predicted length of the jth silence gap ⌧ : packetization delay t j : the end of the jth silence gap t t j ; generate a random number ✓ between 0 and ✓ max ; if x s j  y o,s j then M ✓(x p,s j x s j ); while the add rate of dummy packets is less than lim add do t t + ⌧ ; if t <
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of the pattern hiding module. The evaluation is on the e↵ectiveness of pattern hiding and resistance to replay attacks.
Experiment Setup
In order to get natural audio traces for our experiment, we set up the experiment as Figure   5 .1. Basically, we collect 40 speeches from YouTube.com for the experiment. The length of the speeches is between 10 and 15 minutes. We feed the speeches to the X-Lite 3.0 VoIP client software. Detail shows follow:
Software
In our experiment, we use two machines (a data collection machine(Computer1) and a support machine(Computer2)) which both installed X-Lite 3.0 for the network communication. We also installed Wireshark 1.12.2 on the data collection machine that use for catch the packets. X-Lite 3.0: is used as VoIP software that send audio packet from a computer to another computer. For the codec part, we choose the µlaw codec in X-Lite to covert the speeches into VoIP packets due to the popularity of the µlaw codec. Wiresharks 1.12.2: is used for collect packet between above two computers.
SIP Account
In this experiment, we used same network communication tool in two di↵erent machines with two SIP Account: jlfang@sip2sip.info and jlfang@iptel.org.
Data Collection
After we setup the two X-Lite on both data collection and support machines, we made a call from the data collection machine to the support machine and at the same time, we run the data collection software: Wireshark on the data collection machine. Then we play speeches h that we collected from Youtube.com. Picture ?? is the picture for part of data we collected. From this picture, we can easily identify the packet number, packet send time, source, destination, protocol and other specific data information.
4. Data Analysis After we collected data from Wireshark 1.12.2, we import these data into Microsoft Excel for further analysis. In this analysis, we mostly focused on the time interval between two packets in di↵erent situation: talk and silence, which related to our research information: talk spurt and silence gap. 
Performance Metrics
We use DTW correlation, a correlation metric based on the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm to evaluate the hiding performance. We do not use Pearson's correlation defined in (4.1) because silence gaps may be covered by dummy packets and talk spurts may be removed through packet drops. The "missing" data can significantly reduce Pearson's correlation and an adversary has no idea on the location of the "missing" talk spurts and silence gaps because the adversary has no access to content of encrypted VoIP packets.
A classical approach to measure similarity between two time series of di↵erent length is the DTW algorithm, which has been used in various tra c analysis research topics such as website fingerprinting [7] and denial of service (DoS) attack detection [10] . In this research project, we use the DTW algorithm to find the best alignment of the on-o↵ pattern in the input tra c and the on-o↵ pattern in the output tra c. The DTW correlation is calculated as Pearson's correlation of the aligned on-o↵ patterns in the input tra c and in the output tra c. As shown in 1. When lim add , the rate limit on adding dummy packets, increases, the DTW correlation decreases. The trend is expected as more dummy packets can fill more silence gaps and in turn hide tra c patterns more e↵ectively. (a) For the same rate limit on dummy packets (lim add ), the 5% increase in the limit of drop rate (lim drop ) and 100ms increase in the delay limit (lim delay ) can only slightly improve the hiding performance.
(b) The hiding performance changes significantly with the rate limit on dummy packets (lim add ). From our experiment data, we also observe that the actual dummy packet rate is much lower than the limit lim add . For example, a typical actual dummy packet rate is 42%.46 when lim add is 100%. The limit lim add is not fully utilized as the optimization solutions may not lie at the constraint boundaries. 1. The DTW correlation decreases when the limit on the drop rate increases. It is because more packet drops can also lead to better pattern hiding.
When the limit lim
drop approaches 100%, the DTW correlation is still close to 0.7. We checked the experiment data and found that the typical drop rate was 43.52%, still far far from 100% when the limit lim drop was 100%. It is because the optimization solutions may not occur at the constraint boundaries. For VoIP communications, a large drop rate causes significant QoS degradation and conversations may not be able to continue. So in the following experiments, we limit the drop rate within 5%. 1. The hiding performance improves when the delay limit increases. It is consistent with our intuition as a larger delay limit gives the optimization module more flexibility in scheduling VoIP packets to optimize the pattern hiding.
2. We can also observe that when the rate limit on dummy packets is 20% and the limit on the drop rate are 5%, the pattern hiding performance does not improve significantly when the delay limit increases. 
Resistance to Replay Attacks
In this set of experiments, we replay the same speech to the pattern hiding module. The goal of the replay attacks is to find out the output tra c traces that are generated from the same speech. The resistance to the replay attacks is evaluated with the detection rate, defined as the ratio of the correct detections to the number of attempts. In each attempt, the candidate pool has one trace generated from the same speech as the trace of interest and 19 traces generated from other speeches. So a random guess results in a detection rate of
. Figure 5 .6 shows the detection rate with various limits on the dummy packets, packet drop rate, and packet delay. We make the following observations from the experiment results:
1. In both curves, the detection rate decreases when the limit on the dummy packet rate (lim add ) increases. When lim add = 100%, lim drop = 5%, andlim delay = 100ms, the detection rate reaches 24%, close to the detection rate of a random guess.
A increase of lim
drop from 0 to 5% and a increase of lim delay from 0ms to 100ms can bring down the detection rates by around 5% when lim add 20%. In this section, we discuss the optimization step, the experiments, and extension of the hiding approach.
We use Pearson's correlation in the optimization step and use the DTW correlation in evaluating the hiding approach. We choose Pearson's correlation instead of the DTW correlation in the optimization step because of the following two reasons:
1. The DTW correlation also contains an optimization process that finds the best alignment of the input tra c pattern and the output tra c pattern. Usually dynamic programming is used for the optimization. So the optimization process is time-consuming and it is not suitable for the online optimization required by the hiding approach.
2. The optimization based on Pearson's correlation has closed-form solutions. So the optimization can be finished in 5ms, which is much shorter than even the packetization delay of VoIP packets. As we explain in the previous section, Pearson's correlation can not be used for evaluation as talk spurts and silence gaps can be removed by the hiding approach.
We evaluate the e↵ectiveness of the hiding approach on its resistance to replay attacks.
Essentially the replay attack is equivalent to the speech identification, which aims to identify tra c traces generated from the same speech. In our future work, we plan to evaluate the e↵ectiveness of the pattern hiding approach with other identification tasks such as speaker identification and language identification. We choose speech identification in this paper because the speech identification can achieve much higher identification rates than other identification tasks when no pattern hiding approach is in use. • A adversary behavior model which lunches tra c analysis attacks.
• New pattern hiding module that are able to hide voice tra c pattern in Internet.
• New measuring method that used to measure the e↵ectiveness in countering tra c analysis attacks.
In Chapter 2, we included a literature survey of existing researches on Internet and VoIP communication security to show their advantages and defect. Consequently, we summarized their common defect as follows: unable to prevent timing-based tra c analysis attack.
In Chapter 3, we defined the problem statement and our assumption. So we normalized the behavior of adversary and our pattern hiding module.
In Chapter 4, we formally proposed our pattern hiding module. Our pattern hiding module has 3 steps: prediction step, optimization step and compensation step. Prediction step provide forecast value of talk spurts and silence gap which will be used in later optimization step.
Optimization step provide optimal value which minimized the correlation between original time series and new time series and then pass it to compensation step. Compensation step modify the optimal value based on constrain and give the final value and position of packets that will be output to the Internet.
In Chapter 5, we set up a series of experiments and analyzed the experiment result. First, we collect 40 audio traces from Youtube.com then we set up four experiment based on these traces, which used to test di↵erent module function. For the first three experiments, we test the following methods: add dummy packets, drop original packets and delay original packets.
Experiment result shows that all these methods are able to decrease the correlation between new times series and original time series just like our hypothesis. The fourth experiment, we designed to test our pattern hiding module's resistance to relay attacks. The experiment result shows that, with appropriate constraint, our module has very high resistance to these attackers who even knows our module design theory and structure.
In Chapter 6, we discussed our optimization step, experiments and extension of the hiding approach. First, we explained why we used two di↵erent correlation techniques in the module.
Then we evaluated the experiment result and e↵ectiveness on relay attacks: our experiments show the hiding approach can e↵ectively hide tra c patterns and resist replay attacks to identify the same speech.
Future Work
In this thesis, we focus on hiding the on-o↵ pattern in VoIP communications. We believe the approach can also be extended to hide tra c patterns in other communications with various QoS requirements. The approach can also be more e↵ective for delay-tolerant communications such as email and ftp because of the removal of the delay constraints. We plan to work on the extension in our future work.
APPENDIX . SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The objective function (4.2) can be simplified as follows: 2bc ad , the minimum occurs at the critical point. Otherwise the minimum occurs at the end points defined by the constraints.
